The final hearing rested on the legal question of whether non-citizens can vote. Arguing alongside his mentor, Murray McConnel, Douglas focused on the constitutional antecedents of Illinois election law. According to Douglas, the original Northwest Ordinance “permitted alien inhabitants to vote.” Douglas further claimed that the Constitution upheld this right, noting that “whenever the constitution speaks of a voter, or elector, it uses the word ‘inhabitant’ and not ‘citizen’ of the United States,” and that these words “are not used as synonymous terms.” Therefore, inhabitants may vote even before they become citizens.
Justin Butterfield, a Chicago-based Whig, led the counterargument. Butterfield began by dismissing Douglas’ claim that “inhabitant” and “citizen” have different meanings. He pointed to the state constitutions of New York, New Hampshire, and Ohio which “by law restricted the right of voting to such inhabitants as are citizens.” Butterfield found Douglas’ discussion of the Northwest Ordinance irrelevant, claiming that “it would be absurd to contend that the states formed out of the northwest territory possess any other or different rights than the original states.” Overall, Butterfield claimed that “the admission of alien votes is a violation of the spirit and meaning of the constitution.”
Beyond the legal details, Butterfield also argued that allowing non-citizen votes threatened the integrity of American elections. If states could eliminate citizenship voting requirements, theoretically they could “altogether dispense with the condition of residence, and extend the right of voting to aliens . . . on the same day of landing on our shores.” Taken to this logical extreme, an expanded voter pool would render citizenship meaningless. Butterfield concluded with a peroration on the sanctity of elections, stating that because the nation’s “health and perpetuity depend on [elections’] purity, they should be guarded as with a flaming sword.”
The court published its decision in Spragins v. Houghton on the last day of 1840. Douglas must have been relieved to see that the sole Democratic justice, Theophilus Smith, penned the decision. Smith agreed with Douglas’ reading of the Constitution, finding that “when the qualifications for a voter or elector are named, it uses the word inhabitant and no reference to that of citizen.” Therefore, citizenship is not a Constitutional requirement for voting. After a thorough review of historic congressional debates on voting eligibility, Smith aimed some barbed comments at the defendant, Spragins. To Smith, the fact that Spragins knowingly counted what he considered as an ineligible ballot reflected “a novel attitude, to use no stronger expression.” Hinting disdain for the collusive nature of the case, Smith found that Spragins’ behavior leads to “inferences [that] can not but be peculiar in their nature.” After landing these subtle gibes, Smith stated a clear and decisive verdict- “Jeremiah Kyle was a person legally qualified under the constitution and laws of the state of Illinois to vote.”