Justice  /  Argument

Clarence Thomas Went After My Work. His Criticisms Reveal a Disturbing Fact About Originalism.

If judges are going to use history as their guide, they should probably try to get the history right.

When, a decade ago, I was a graduate student toiling away on my dissertation, I could not have imagined that Justice Clarence Thomas would one day devote a lengthy footnote in a Supreme Court opinion to arguing why my obscure historical research was wrong. But that is what happened in the court’s recent decision in Haaland v. Brackeen. By a 7–2 vote, the court upheld the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)—a critical federal law that provides procedural protections for Native children when their parents are unable to care for them—against a long-standing campaign begun by right-wing think tanks to overturn it.

Unfortunately, Brackeen doesn’t fully end that campaign against ICWA, which has been going on longer than I’ve been an academic. The conservative organizations behind the case have already pledged to find new plaintiffs to bring the equal protection claims that the court avoided on standing grounds—litigation that Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s (lone) concurrence invites. But Brackeen is still a hugely significant, and critical, victory. The Brackeens and Texas brought a laundry list of constitutional challenges to the law, and many of them succeeded in the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. But this very conservative Supreme Court flatly and decisively rejected those claims. That’s a big win.

My involvement in the case stems from my work as a historian of the legal relationship between the United States and Native nations—what was known as “Indian affairs.” Back in 2015, while still a student, I wrote an article on the constitutional history of federal authority in this area. In it, I critiqued Justice Thomas’ musings in his 2013 concurrence in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that ICWA exceeded the original understanding of congressional power. I wrote that article for a simple reason: After several years digging into the archival materials for another project, I knew that Thomas’ opinion rested on a law review article by Robert Natelson that had glaring, objective errors in evidence. It seemed important to me to try to set the historical record straight as best I could.

Years later, Brackeen ended up turning partly on this historical question. As Slate has traced, the lead-up to the case featured the bizarre experience of having Natelson respond to my scholarly critique of his article by labeling me “shyster-like” and launching an all-out (and, at least to my mind, surprisingly easily disproven) assault against me. And in Brackeen, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s lengthy concurrence and Thomas’ equally lengthy dissent recapitulated this kerfuffle (without the ad hominem attacks, fortunately). In a sense, their debate was an originalist battle over the proper interpretation of the historical evidence.