The news on climate change was not good to begin with, and is getting worse. This chapter examines our collective efforts to address this increasingly grave and urgent problem. I trace the evolution of the climate regime and the shift from “old” to “new” governance. Despite its relative newness compared to other global issues, there has been a transformation in climate governance over the last two decades. Most characterize this as a transition from a traditional hierarchical model of governance, embodied by the Kyoto Protocol to a more bottom-up approach codified in the Paris Agreement. I argue that this is an overly simplified distinction. In fact, Kyoto contained both markets and networks, which were significant parts of its design. Similarly, Paris preserves an important – and indeed expanded – role for states.
Nonetheless, there is a shift in how the climate regime operates now versus “then.” I detail these differences and suggest two primary drivers for the change. First, profound geopolitical changes – namely the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) – quickly made the Kyoto Protocol politically untenable. Second, the rise of global rationalization meant that states conceived of climate change primarily as a technical problem. All the while market ideologies of governance were lurking in the background, reinforcing the notion that markets, rather than governments, could provide the necessary innovation and action to address climate change. This view papered over profound political conflicts which ultimately led to Kyoto’s failure.
I suggest that the new governance, embodied by the Paris Agreement, goes further to address these problems. And while the processes institutionalized by Paris provide some reasons for optimism, the outcomes fall far short of what is needed. At present the Paris Agreement falls well short of its own stated goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. “New governance” has clearly been good for building new institutions, and is a more flexible and politically realistic approach to climate change. The bet is that this arrangement is better suited to both the realities of domestic politics and profound uncertainty surrounding climate change than the old governance model. If we are correct then we have created the enabling conditions for decarbonization. The question is: will it happen fast enough?
It is not an overstatement to say that the answer to this question is critical both for the future of the planet and the legitimacy of global governance. Climate change will likely exacerbate existing problems in world politics such as armed conflict and mass migration.1 And the iron law of climate change is that those least responsible will be most affected, creating an ever greater need for global action. A shift to a “new” global governance architecture means little if climate change continues apace. To preserve the legitimacy of the climate regime, as well as much of the fabric of the current liberal international order (such as it is), actors will have to move more swiftly and decisively toward a fossil fuel-free world.