The generally-accepted and agreed-upon history of the colonies’ means of financing the American Revolution is primary accepted in the following narrative:
As the war for independence commenced, expenses quickly mounted and the Continental Congress began printing a new currency in order to finance itself and the war effort. Although there were plans to establish a mint at some point, Congress had little choice but to rely on fiat paper money as the chief source of financing the Revolution during the war years. Although the young republic was issued some preliminary loans by France—eager to see the American rebels succeed in reducing Great Britain’s power by achieving independence—the loans were not sufficient to cover the full cost of the war, and so the rebellious colonies and their congress were compelled to issue their own currencies.
The new dollars failed miserably as Congress printed copious amounts of them. There are clearly defined characteristics of sound money, chief among them being a good store of value and the ability to act as a medium of exchange, but the Continental (the term used to refer to Congress’s dollars) possessed neither. The notes were issued in such vast quantities that they quickly lost their value and became nearly worthless, putting the Revolution in peril as many questioned the integrity of the money. The currency failed as a medium of exchange, as those on the receiving end knew they were being given essentially worthless paper.
With Congress printing vast quantities of these Continentals, their value plummeted to the point of hyperinflation, as more and more dollars circulated competing for the same quantity of goods. Seeking to get their financial house in order, Congress appointed the Robert Morris, the wealthy Pennsylvania-based financier, as its Superintendent of Finance in 1781. Understanding the connection between the republic’s struggles to finance itself and the rapidly devaluing Continental, Morris took corrective measures to both strengthen the dollar and cut expenses. Often using his own personal fortune to directly finance the Revolution and give General Washington crucial aid in times of need, combined with his expertise in financial affairs and its appropriate application to the new republic’s dire financial situation, Morris was able to ensure that Congress remained solvent throughout the war, narrowly avoiding multiple financial calamities along the way. Such is the tale of financing the American Revolution.
There is, however, a much darker side of Revolutionary finance that is largely ignored by both scholars and the general public alike, and that is the issuance of commissary certificates by the Continental Army under Congress’s authority. These instruments of revolutionary finance were mainly deployed against the American people wherever and whenever the needs of the army were seen to outweigh citizens’ property rights, and they usually amounted to little more than a roundabout way for the Continental Army to simply seize provisions from civilians.