I thought it might be useful to explain the history of the Monroe Doctrine, what it actually meant in 1823 when John Quincy Adams wrote it, and how it has evolved since then. This material is also central to one of the chapters in my new, in-progress book on John Quincy Adams, so it is interesting (fun? weird? confusing? nerve-racking?) to see it so relevant today.
In the late 1810s and early 1820s, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Mexico had declared independence, and Cuba and Puerto Rico appeared to be following in their wake. Meanwhile, in Europe, conservative authoritarians were on the march. In the wake of Emperor Napoleon’s final defeat and banishment, Tsar Alexander I had formed the Holy Alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Austria to support the principles of divine monarchy and their shared religiosity, to bully other European monarchs into submission, and to crush rebellions. They demonstrated this commitment by backing the unpopular Bourbon kings, Louis XVIII and Charles X, and dispatching a military force to Spain to restore King Ferdinand VII to absolute rule.
Rumors swirled in Washington, D.C that the Alliance forces were posed to move on Latin America and restore Spanish colonial rule. In response, Britain extended an offer to President Monroe, through correspondence with John Quincy Adams, to join forces to keep the Holy Alliance at bay. The British fleet did a brisk trade with South American nations and did not particularly want Russian or French fleets interfering in their business.
Russian aggression and a potential British alliance posed three interconnected questions. First, should Americans come to the aid of their sister revolutionaries in Europe or Latin America? Second, how should the government respond to European territorial aggression? Third, should the United States respond in concert with Great Britain, which had its own economic interests to defend in South America?
Adams crafted a three-piece plan that brushed back Russian meddling, forbade European interference, kept British forces at bay, and protected the United States from entangling itself in costly and messy wars. The first piece was an official letter to Russia, laying out the clash between the two nation’s fundamental principles. Adams wrote, the “United States recognize in other Nations the right which they claim and exercise for themselves, of establishing and of modifying their own Governments, according to their own judgments, and views of their own interests, not encroaching upon the rights of others.” This world view offered a sharp contrast to the force and intimidation imposed by Russia. Adams also insisted the United States hoped to maintain friendly relations with all nations, including Russia, but he was drawing a firm ideological line between republics and autocracies.