Beyond / Antecedent

The Puzzle of Non-Proliferation

Today, only nine countries have nuclear weapons. That outcome was hardly inevitable, and the story of how we arrived there holds important lessons for AI.

by Carl Robichaud via Asterisk on June 1, 2023

...agreed to “pursue negotiations in good faith” to end the nuclear-arms race and pursue disarmament under “strict and effective international control,” a mandate with no timeline. Finally, the treaty called for technical cooperation toward peaceful uses of civilian nuclear technology.6

To say the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had limitations would be an understatement. It lacked universality and effective verification. It had a duration of 25 years and would require extension every subsequent five years. Two nuclear-armed states, France and China, declined to join, as did a number of other states, including some with active weapons programs: Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa.

So while it is tempting to see the NPT as a turning point in the proliferation story, the treaty in its early years was akin to a white picket fence — more signal than barrier. States continued to hedge, adding to their nuclear capabilities without crossing the line into weaponization.

For a sane nuclear policy (1964). Saul Bass (American, 1920-1996). Courtesy of Library of Congress.

Alarm and response

Intelligence analysts and outside experts remained pessimistic that nuclear spread could be contained. A threshold was crossed in 1967 when Israel secretly built a bomb, shrouded in ambiguity. Then in 1974 India detonated what it claimed was a “peaceful nuclear explosive” (code-named Operation Smiling Buddha). The dam seemed poised to break, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency predicted that 10 other nations had the potential and incentives to go nuclear.⁷

But that never happened. After 1974, only North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa acquired nuclear weapons. South Africa dismantled its stockpile of six warheads in 1989. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine traded away the Soviet weapons stranded on their soil in return for economic and security assistance. Illicit programs in Iraq, Syria, and Libya notwithstanding, the system has held up surprisingly well for the past 50 years.

India’s test was something of a pivotal moment in galvanizing international action. It was a demonstration that countries not aligned with Washington or Moscow could get nuclear weapons, and it led to a loosely coordinated response.

First, the major powers leaned on their allies. Over the coming years, the U.S. reiterated security guarantees for allies in Europe and Asia who would forego nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union suppressed nuclear aspirations among its Warsaw Pact allies. These arrangements were transactional: To get protection from NATO or the Soviet Union you needed to forego nuclear ambitions.

Second, nuclear exporters reinforced the thin filament of the NPT into a thicker web of regulations and controls. The first strand was the 1974 “trigger list,” specifying which nuclear items required IAEA safeguards to export. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, which began in 1974 as the London Club, formed to set voluntary guidelines on sensitive exports. NPT membership expanded from 46 to 91 countries by the second conference in 1975. Signatories to these agreements adopted international guidelines into domestic law. The IAEA increased its professional staff and competency with the support of its member states.